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Abstract
Objective. Over past decades, Australian and Canadian Indigenous primary healthcare policies have focused on
supporting community controlled Indigenous health organisations. After more than 20 years of sustained effort, over 89%of
eligible communities in Canada are currently engaged in the planning, management and provision of community controlled
health services. In Australia, policy commitment to community control has also been in place for more than 25 years, but
implementation has been complicated by unrealistic timelines, underdeveloped change management processes, inflexible
funding agreements and distrust. This paper discusses the lessons from the Canadian experience to inform the continuing
efforts to achieve the implementation of community control in Australia.
Methods. We reviewed Canadian policy and evaluation grey literature documents, and assessed lessons and
recommendations for relevance to the Australian context.
Results. Our analysis yielded three broad lessons. First, implementing community control takes time. It took Canada
20 years to achieve 89% implementation. To succeed, Australia will need to make a firm long term commitment to this
objective. Second, implementing community control is complex.Communities require adequate resources to support change
management. And third, accountability frameworks must be tailored to the Indigenous primary health care context to be
meaningful.
Conclusions. We conclude that although the Canadian experience is based on a different context, the processes and
tools created to implement community control in Canada can help inform the Australian context.
What is known about the topic? Although Australia has promoted Indigenous control over primary healthcare (PHC)
services, implementation remains incomplete. Enduring barriers to the transfer of PHC services to community control have
not been addressed in the largely sporadic attention to this challenge to date, despite significant recent efforts in some
jurisdictions.
What does this paper add? The Canadian experience indicates that transferring PHC from government to community
ownership requires sustained commitment, adequate resourcing of the change process and the development of a meaningful
accountability framework tailored to the sector.
What are the implications for practitioners? Policy makers in Australia will need to attend to reform in contractual
arrangements (towards pooled or bundled funding), adopt a long-termvision for transfer andfindways to harmonise the roles
of federal and state governments. The arrangements achieved in some communities in theAustralianCoordinatedCareTrials
(and still in place) provide a model.
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Introduction
Internationally, primary healthcare (PHC)1 renewal continues to
be identified as a key pathway to achieving health equity,meeting
the needs of underserved and poorly served populations, and
for improving the efficiency of healthcare systems.2–4 PHC
services generally include four key components: (1) primary care
provided by general practitioners (GPs) and, more recently, by
nurse practitioners; (2) primary prevention activities (health
promotion) designed to prevent the onset of illness; (3) secondary
prevention interventions focused on assisting in the management
of chronic illness to avoid or delay the development of
complications; and (4) tertiary prevention interventions designed
to assist in the management of complications, to ensure that
optimal autonomy is retained.Advocacy and referrals are integral
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components.1 Comprehensive PHC, the goal of Indigenous
providers of health care (and some others), also emphasises the
need to attend to and be informed by the social determinants of
health that affect the health and life chances of the people, and
their access to good health care. In this paper, the focus is on the
provision of comprehensive PHC by Indigenous community-
based organisations.
Evidence shows that when PHC is not accessible (geograph-
ically, economicallyor culturally), responsiveor effective, people
delay seekinghelp, relyon emergencycare and lose thebenefits of
continuity of care.2,5 In many countries, histories of colonialism
have resulted in power differentials that negatively affect PHC
access and responsiveness to Indigenous people’s needs. For the
past 25 years, both Canada and Australia have endorsed com-
munity control of Indigenous health services, but implementation
has followed different pathways. Canada has focused on trans-
ferring pre-existing PHC services previously delivered by the
federal government to the established First Nations local gov-
ernment authorities ‘on reserves’ (i.e. for discrete First Nations
communities). In the Canadian context, community control over
these services has been constrained by a disconnect between
resourcing and needs, as well as some contractual inflexibilities,
which, at times, undermine responsiveness.6,7 Australia has
established a multiplicity of Commonwealth, state and territory
funding programs for community-controlled PHC8 in response to
community activism in the 1970s. The Aboriginal Community
Controlled Health Organisation (ACCHO) sector has grown
substantially over the past 40 years, largely through the funding
of community-initiated submissions. In the Australian context,
community-controlled PHC has been constrained by an over-
reliance on short-term specific-purpose funding and inflexible
contractual obligations.9 More recently, some jurisdictions
have been promoting the transfer of PHC services delivered in
Aboriginal communities from the state or territory health author-
ity to an Aboriginal community-based governance structure.
However, the process in both countries has been bumpy and
complex.
Policies in favour of Indigenous community control clearly
face implementation challenges in both countries. The aim of
the present paper is to contribute to continuing efforts to
achieve implementation, with a particular focus on how the
Canadian experience could inform Australian implementation
approaches.
Methods
Canadian challenges and strategieswere reviewed,with reference
to policy and evaluation documents (grey literature) that emerged
over time. The Canadian strategies were then assessed for
relevance to the Australian context, recognising the common
complexities of implementing community control across com-
munities with diverse needs, capacities and experience, the
challenges of formulating a meaningful accountability frame-
work and the need for adaptation of administrative arrangements
to support the delivery of responsive PHC.
Results and Discussion
In Canada, provincial governments have constitutional respon-
sibility for the planning and delivery of healthcare services.
The federal government started to assume responsibility for
the delivery of health services on-reserve in the 1920s,10 on
humanitarian grounds (so federal policy states) or basedonTreaty
obligations (according to First Nations; for a more detailed
discussion, see Boyer11). By the mid-1960s, most of the 610
First Nation reserve communities had access to some level of
public health and PHC services delivered by federally employed
nurses and interpreters. Community Health Representatives
(CHRs; the Canadian equivalent of Aboriginal Health Workers)
were added to the team in the mid-1970s, along with Addiction
Prevention Workers (APWs). The role of the CHRs was to
assist nurses with prevention and treatment activities. CHRs and
APWs were employed by the community, with funding from
the federal government. This was the beginning of community
control.
CHRs and APWs were employed in nearly all First Nation
communities; only very small communities were not provided
with this opportunity. CHRs and APWs were hired by Chief and
Council, the governance structure originally created by the Indian
Act in 1876.12 The Chief and Council governance structure is
the equivalent of local government, and continues to be the point
of contact for consultation, negotiations and, in some cases, joint
decision making with other levels of government (municipal,
regional, provincial or federal). Chief and Council can also, if the
communitywishes, exercise somecontrol over community-based
schools, health services, child protection, economic develop-
ment, community infrastructure and other federally funded
programs.13
In 1985, a change was made to the Canadian Constitution
(Section 35) recognising the right of First Nations, Inuit and
Métis’ to self-government. Greater opportunities for community
control emerged as a result. Funding options includemultidepart-
ment funding agreements (MDFA), block funding agreements
(BFA) and flexible funding agreements (FFA). Flexibility
depends on the model chosen by the community. MDFAs are
the most flexible because they bring together multiple social
programs, such as health, education, child welfare, economic
development, income assistance, infrastructure, housing and
local governance, under a single relational agreement. In contrast,
BFAs and FFAs relate to health services only. BFAs are block-
fundedflexible agreements signed for 3–5years.Anewversionof
this option is being offered, allowing communities to sign for up
to 10 years, with opportunities to add new programs as they
emerge. In contrast, communities that sign an FFA must instead
secure the federal government’s permission before moving fund-
ingbetweenbudgetary lines.14Theseoptions havebeen relatively
well received by First Nations, with 89% of the eligible 610 First
Nation communities involved in one or other type of agreement as
of 2008.15Communitieswho are not interested or ready to engage
in this process (because of a perceived lack of capacity or other
priorities) continue to receive their community-based PHC from
federal government employees.
Pre-existing services delivered by the First Nations and Inuit
Health Branch of Health Canada (FNIHB; the Canadian equiv-
alent of the Office of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health
(OATSIH)) are being transferred to community control. Com-
munities wanting to manage on-reserve health services simply
express this interest to the federal government. Unless the com-
munity has a history of management challenges with other
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programs, the federal government extends bridge funding for
12 months for the community to undertake a community needs
assessment and develop a community health plan.16 Funding for
community health services is based on historical expenditures in
that community, and this is for the most part non-negotiable.6
Once the community health plan has been approved by the federal
government, community control can be implemented. Commu-
nities can choose to sign an agreement alone or as part of a
multicommunity consortium. Communities of less than 500
members are precluded from signing a BFA unless they affiliate
themselves with other communities because of sustainability
issues. Communities receive separate funding to undertake an
evaluation of their services every 5 years. Recent work has
demonstrated that First Nation-controlled services are able to
deliver on health outcomes.17
The accountability struggle
Canada has struggled with issues of accountability. When com-
munity control was initially implemented, agreements included
onerous reporting requirements. Local FNIHB program man-
agers adopted pragmatic strategies to ease that burden by over-
looking missing reports of little utility.7 In 1997, the Auditor
General of Canada chastised FNIHB for not following up on
missing reports.18 From then on, punitive measures (withholding
of funding) were put in place to ensure that all reporting require-
ments were met.19 In 2004, the Auditor General of Canada
revisited First Nations’ reporting requirements, suggesting that,
in fact, these were unduly onerous, dictated by government
funders rather than based on consultations, of low use for
community organisations, incremental because new programs
added reports without considering the overall reporting burden,
failed to informon performance andwere largely unused to report
to Parliament.20
The Auditor General of Canada further pointed out that
‘there’s not much point in First Nations exchanging data for
dollars with the federal governmentwhen the information is of no
real benefit to either party’.21 Lavoie et al.7 documented that in
2003–04, First Nations in the province of British Columbia (169
communities) produced an estimated 5813 reports to meet
their accountability requirements for health services alone.
They further noted that many reports were never read because
FNIHB lacked the human resources to do so. First Nations
and FNIHB confirmed having little use for the information
collected.
A key barrier to consolidating a meaningful reporting frame-
work has been the accountability requirements of TreasuryBoard
of Canada Secretariat (hereafter TreasuryBoard), which oversees
accountability for all federal programs, grants and contribution
agreements. In 2006, an independent Blue Ribbon Panel
appointed by the Treasury Board reviewed all grants and con-
tributions ($27 billion CND in annual spending), including those
discussed herein. They concluded that:
(1) There is a need for fundamental change in theway the federal
government understands, designs, manages and accounts for
its grant and contribution programs.
(2) Not only is it possible to simplify administration while
strengthening accountability, but it is absolutely necessary
to do the first in order to ensure the latter.
(3) Making changes in an area of government as vast and
multifaceted as grants and contributions will require sus-
tained leadership at the political and public service levels.22
To operationalise these, the Blue Ribbon Panel recommended
the following.
(1) Increased respect for recipients of grants and contribution
agreements, and the reframing of this relationship as a
partnership.
(2) A marked simplification of the reporting and accountability
regimen to reflect the circumstances and capacities of reci-
pients and the real information needs of the federal
government.
(3) Encouraging innovation, stating that ‘the goal of grants and
contribution programs is not to eliminate errors but to achieve
results, and that requires a sensible regime of risk manage-
ment and performance reporting’.22
(4) Organising information collected so that it can serve program
managers and recipients alike.
The panel noted that mechanisms other than grants or con-
tributions are needed for the funding of essential services such as
health, education and social assistance in First Nation commu-
nities because grants and contribution agreements lead to costly
and unnecessary reporting burden.
The report of the Blue Ribbon Panel led to the revisions in
the contribution agreements used by FNIHB discussed above.
FNIHBwas also tasked to consolidate reporting requirements and
reduce the burden. A first iteration was produced in 2008.23,24
Another revision is underway, in consultation with First Nations
provincial organisations (peakbodies for communities), to further
reduce onerous requirements and include key outcome indicators
developed by FNIHB.25
Lessons for Australia?
The Canadian context is very different from the Australian one.
Importantly, there are no equivalents to the treaties and the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 that recognised continuing Indigenous
rights in Canada. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples
are not recognised in theAustralian Constitution and government
responsibility for Indigenous health is not defined in health law.26
Thus, there is no enduring basis for accountability by govern-
ments for improvements in Aboriginal health care, including for
transferring PHC provision to community-controlled healthcare
providers, despite continuing policy commitments.26,27 Further,
despite earlier policy commitments to self-determination,28 the
policy discourse has largely shifted away from Indigenous rights
and towards a focus on ‘closing the gap’ in social, economic and
health status indicators between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
Australians.29
Second, First Nations are taking on pre-existing services,
previously delivered by the federal government in discrete com-
munities, whereas this is not usually the case in Australia, where
community-controlled services have more often been created de
novo. When taking on community control, the responsibility for
the management and delivery of services is transferred to a pre-
existing governance structure that has been regulated by a federal
act of parliament since 1876. In contrast, Australian community-
controlled health services are non-government organisations
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owned by the local community and incorporated under various
national or state laws.
Finally, BFAs and FFAs are transfers from a single level of
government. MDFAs, when associated with land claim agree-
ments, can be tripartite agreements between the federal depart-
ment in charge of First Nation health, the Ministry in charge of
First Nation education, economic development, income assis-
tance, governance etc. and the First Nation. For example, the
Nisga’a Agreement, the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agree-
ment, and the Labrador Inuit Association Agreement are legis-
lated tripartite agreements that include provisions for self-
administration of health services.30 Accountability provisions
forMDFAagreements sit outside the usual grant and contribution
agreement frameworks, and provide First Nations who are sig-
natories with budgetary line flexibility across healthcare, income
assistance, economic developments and other spheres of govern-
ment funding. These agreements can facilitate cross-sectoral
innovations focused on determinants of health. There is no
equivalent in Australia (Table 1).
Given these important differences, what then can be learned
from such a different context?
Lesson 1: implementing community
control takes time
As shown in Fig. 1, implementing community control
in Canada to the 89% level took 20 years (1989–2008),15 despite
the fact that community control was being implemented in
communities with considerable engagement with the communi-
ty-based healthcare services and a governance structure that had
been in place since 1876. In Australia, efforts to transfer services
to community control are generally conducted under tight time-
lines,31 which are generally not achieved, leaving a sense of
failure and opportunities for allocating blame.32
25






























































































































Fig. 1. Community control uptake in Canada over time: Transfer and integrated models.
Table 1. Comparison of contexts and processes for implementing community control in Canada and Australia
Canada Australia
Pre-existing health services are being
transferred
Yes Local services often created de novo; some transfers from
state governments
Transfer is to a pre-existing Indigenous
governance structure that manages
other programs as well
Yes No; some health services established by existing
community organisations
Single government (federal) to single
government (First Nation) transfer
Self-government agreements can be tripartite;
others are single government transfers
No; transfer requires tripartite agreements
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Lesson 2: supporting change management
with resources
As discussed above, the federal government initially funds
First Nations for 12 months to develop a community health plan
that reflects community-identified priorities. Every 5 years, the
same organisations receive funding to undertake an evaluation of
their services, which is used to adjust the community health plan
before renewal. Research suggests that this change management
cycle is key to ensuring continuous improvement.7
Lesson 3: tackling the thorny issue of accountability
Canada is slowly developing tailored mechanisms designed
to fund First Nation health organisations. Accountability frame-
works based onmeaningful indicators are attached to the funding
mechanisms. Although the work is far from complete, tailored
administrative instruments are more likely to yield meaningful
information that can be used by federal and First Nation program
managers to ensure that services deliver on their objectives.
This work needs to happen in Australia as well, but there are
significant barriers. The problems of low levels of trust across
cultures, and the continuing effects of histories of dispossession
and conflict are important factors. However, they are common to
both countries. We suggest that there are three major barriers that
differentially affect approaches to the implementation of com-
munity control in Australia.
Current contractual arrangements are ill-equipped to deliver
PHC outcomes The first barrier stems from the fact that Aus-
tralia embraced the contractual approaches of new public man-
agement (NPM) more thoroughly than Canada,33 which means
that moving to an approach that meets the needs of PHC is more
difficult. Evidence shows that over-reliance on NPM-informed
contractual agreements is unhelpful to local governance in rural
and remote Indigenous communities.34 In funding PHC, this
approach, with its focus on tendering predefined specific health
interventions, has also been found tobe apoorfit9,35 becausePHC
requires continuity of care and long-term trust-based relation-
ships between healthcare providers and clients. Amodel for such
a funding arrangement exists in the agreement still in place for
Katherine West Health Board in the Northern Territory (a funds-
pooling arrangement originally established as part of the Coor-
dinated Care Trials36).
Implementing sustainable and effective community control
in Australia will take time, and success requires a long-term
vision and resources for change In many rural and remote
Australian Aboriginal communities, where the jurisdictional
health authority provides basic primary care, transfer to commu-
nity control will require careful community processes of devel-
opment and agreement making in order to establish a structure
and plan for local or regional ownership and delivery of PHC.
This needs tobe supported inpolicy andguidelines, resourced and
factored into timelines. So far, and in the context of the legacy
of dispossession and community dislocation, Australian govern-
ments have underestimated the amount of work and time re-
quired.32 Political commitment that endures beyond election
cycles is also needed.
Accountability on both sides The more complex mix of
funding and regulatory roles between levels of government in
Australia means that no government holds enduring responsibility
for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health, and thus no
government holds clear accountability for improvement.26 Al-
though constitutional reform may be required to fully address
this issue, other solutions include: (1) the allocation of respon-
sibility for PHC to the federal government, as recommended
by the National Health and Hospital Reform Commission;37 or
(2) federal and state agreements enacted in matching legislation,
clarifying roles and responsibilities and harmonising contractual
and accountability requirements.26
Recognition that administrative simplification is necessary
in order to strengthen accountability, as articulated in the Blue
Ribbon Panel report to the Canadian Treasury Board,22 could
provide thebasis for the reformof approaches to fundingcontracts
inAustralia. The development of a national system ofmeaningful
indicators of health care effectiveness in PHC for Aboriginal
people38 is an important step in that direction.
Accountability byACCHOs to their communities is structured
into the sector by community ownership, but enactment and
reporting of that accountability (for quality and access, good
governance and responsiveness to community priorities) is less
visible. The sector is actively working onmethods to address this
requirement (see http://www.naccho.org.au/promote-health/
governance-initiative/, accessed 4 September 2015).
Conclusions
Current efforts to facilitate the development of the community-
controlled sector in Australia stand tomake a unique contribution
to closing the gap in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health.
Canada has been engaged in a similar process for over 20 years,
and the available evidence indicates that the gap can be narrowed
with effective community-controlled PHC.17
The Canadian context is different, and we do not believe
Canadian solutions will fit the Australian context exactly. Still,
Canada’s experience can inform the implementation of commu-
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